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Abstract—The growing relevance and usage intensity of
Online Social Networks (OSNs) along with the accumulation of
a large amount of user data has led to privacy concerns among
researchers and end users. Despite a large body of research
addressing OSN privacy issues, little differentiation of data
types on social network sites is made and a generally accepted
classification and terminology for such data is missing, hence
leading to confusion in related discussions. This paper proposes
a taxonomy for data types on OSNs based on a thorough
literature analysis and a conceptualization of typical OSN user
activities. It aims at clarifying discussions among researchers,
benefiting comparisons of data types within and across OSNs
and at educating the end user about characteristics and
implications of OSN data types. The taxonomy is evaluated
by applying it to four major OSNs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Online Social Networks (OSNs) have reached major im-
portance due to their increased usage and ubiquity, rising
membership and presence in the media. Allowing their users
to create custom profile sites, express relationships with
other users and to explore the resulting social graph [1],
they combine previously available communication and self-
representation functions, such as personal blogs, forums
and instant messaging with novel social functions. Also,
they allow reaching new contacts. The user base of OSNs
is no longer restricted to private end users and college
communities [2], but extends to professionals while serving
as collaboration tools [3].
With the increased usage frequency and ubiquitous usage
of OSNs, the quantity and sensitivity of user data that is
stored on OSNs has grown tremendously as well. This is
fostered by the availability of social networking services
on mobile devices that provide location-based features and
camera functions, for instance allowing users to publish their
current activity and location. It is possible to derive rich
profiles of the users [4], leading to social footprints [5].
Further privacy issues occur not only due to the service
provider’s data usage but also because other OSN users
have access to user data. This leads to the need for targeted
and selective disclosure of personal information to create
several facets of the self – representing different areas of
the physical world – and keep them separated, which is also
referred to as Social Identity Management (SIdM) [6].
Prompted by these developments, privacy concerns have
been voiced by researchers. Numerous studies have been
conducted on privacy issues on OSNs in general [7], [8]
as well as on people’s awareness in this context [9], [10]
and on potential hazards [11], [12]. Proposals for improving
the user’s understanding of disclosed information [13] and
improving privacy protection on OSNs [14] have been made.
Observing the literature on privacy and user control in
OSNs shows that there is little work describing data elements
that are associated with the users, albeit surveying the API
of the popular site Facebook reveals as many as 83 distinct
data elements that can be associated with a user [15].
Works in assessing the access control models in OSNs (e.g.
[16], [17]) do not differentiate between different attributes
of the user identity while others only focus on singular
aspects such as the owner and creator of items [18]. Still,
it is seldom, or only briefly [19] considered that attribute
implementations on OSNs vary widely in implementation,
semantics, applicable policies [20] and privacy controls [21]
and thus carry far-reaching implications for the user.
This paper aims at tackling the possible results of the
lack of a generally accepted terminology for describing
and differentiating data types on OSNs by developing and
proposing a detailed taxonomy. It is intended to benefit
discussions among researchers, alleviate difficulties when
comparing data elements within and across OSNs and pro-
vide guidance for end users when assessing the implications
of dealing with particular OSN data types.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Work
related to classifying OSN data types is discussed and com-
pared to our contribution in the Section II. The scope and
methodology of the research are defined in Section III. The
proposed taxonomy is introduced in Section IV accompanied
by an analysis of related literature and a conceptualization
of fundamental OSN user activities involving user data. The
taxonomy is evaluated in Section V by applying it to four
major OSNs. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
This section provides an overview of related work regard-
ing the study of user activities on OSNs and the conceptu-
alization of data types.
In [22] and [23], fundamental user activities on OSNs
are described. The focus of the analysis in [22] is on
user activities accustomed to a small community of OSN,
which is why it does not allow to draw generic conclusions.
The discussion in [23] is conducted on a high level of
abstraction containing only three different entities and is
used as a basis for the explanation of the variables of a
heterogeneous network. Despite the unsuitable degree of
abstraction and the completely different purposes, the study
of user activities conducted in this paper in order to derive
originating data types has been inspired by the user-centric
approaches introduced above.
In [7], two different approaches for categorizing data are
mentioned. The first one is based on a survey in which
users of OSNs were asked which data they would place on
their profile. Consequently, the resulting classification only
considers the items that were mentioned by the participants
of the survey. In the second approach presented in [7],
user data is divided by focusing on the data’s impact on
privacy. While reasonable for categorizing privacy settings it
is unsuitable for developing a general-purpose taxonomy as
many other dimensions would be omitted. Similarly, Park et
al. [4] also focus on certain aspects of data on OSNs. Data
is categorized on the basis of its visibility (i.e. private or
public) and its creator (i.e. the user himself or others). As
a consequence, unlike this work, the categorization in [4]
lacks a discussion of activity-related data types and solely
focuses on the two dimensions mentioned before.
Beye et al. [24] follow a different approach that builds
upon the definition of OSN by boyd [sic] and Ellison [1]
from which three data types are deduced. Additional six
data types are derived by focusing on the goals of different
OSNs. Compared to the approaches discussed so far, the
one in [24] contains a well-founded explanation on the
origin of the data types. However, their definition (e.g.
the definition of the data type Messages) is considered too
coarse-grained. No distinction is made concerning the item’s
visibility, its creator and the domain in which it is created.
These aspects are of major importance when analyzing the
user’s capabilities on modern OSNs.
Unlike the other authors who needed their classifications
only as a basis for further examinations, Schneier [19]
focuses solely on the task of establishing a taxonomy. How-
ever, his brief discussion lacks a structured methodology
and does not mention any explanation on how he deduced
the data types. Moreover, his taxonomy does not cover all
important aspects of OSNs. For example, there are no data
types in which the user’s relationships or his connection-
related attributes (e.g. IP address) can be arranged. A˚rnes et
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Figure 1. Research model
al. [25] pick up the ideas proposed in [19]. Although being
a meaningful extension to [19], this approach also does not
go into detail about the particular data types and is limited
to a short definition and a list of examples for each category.
A major distinction between all previously discussed
approaches and this paper is the level of granularity. Rather
than aiming at a high-level classification, this work proposes
a fine-grained taxonomy. In addition, the individual data
types are arranged hierarchically, which is a common feature
of taxonomies.
III. RESEARCH SCOPE AND APPROACH
A. Problem Scope
This work aims at developing a taxonomy for describing
and classifying data types on OSNs, thereby benefiting three
areas. A first goal is to improve comparability of user data
within and across OSNs. Further, it intends to provide a
clear terminology for discussions among researchers. Lastly,
it aims at improving the understanding of attribute charac-
teristics on OSNs and their implications by end users.
The goal of this paper is not to provide an exhaustive
list of all attributes and data elements that are available or
disclosed on current OSNs. Rather, it intends to develop
a taxonomy to describe important characteristics of data
types on OSNs and understand their differences, especially
in regards to characteristics specific to OSNs and SIdM.
Note that this work focuses on centralized OSNs and
only covers data types related to user actions that occur
directly on them. External aspects like social plugins (e.g.
Facebook’s Like button) create extensive privacy issues.
However, they have to be discussed seperately and are out
of the scope of this paper. Also note that the subsequent
discussions are solely based on facts and that no assumptions
regarding the actions of OSN service providers are made.
B. Research Approach
Aiming at delivering a taxonomy consisting of constructs
for describing data types on OSNs that are used for abstract-
ing from particular data types, a design-oriented research
approach [26], [27] is applicable to the problem scope.
Table I
MAPPING BETWEEN DATA TYPES OF RELATED CLASSIFICATIONS AND THIS WORK
Schneier [19] Årnes et al. [25] Proposed Taxonomy Beye et al. [24]
Login data Login credentials
Mandatory dataMandatory profile dataService data
ProfilesExtended profile dataExtended profile data
Network data ConnectionsPersonal network data
Ratings / interests Preferences / ratings / interests
Private communication data
Groups
Disclosed data
Entrusted data
Incidental data
Disseminated data
Contextual data
Application data
Connection data
Self published data at home
Self published data away
Other users‘ data
Behavioral data
Connection data
Metadata
Derived data
Behavioral data
Disclosed data
Entrusted data
Incidental data
Derived data
Behavioral information
Tags
Messages
Multimedia
Conception: deviatingcorresponding
For conducting design-oriented research, a process model
consisting of six steps – Problem identification, Elicitation
of solution objectives, Solution design, Demonstration, Eval-
uation, Communication – has been proposed [27].
The research approach employed in this work adapts the
process proposed in [27]. The first step has been performed
in the previous two sections by identifying the problem
and motivating the need for a taxonomy for data types
on OSNs. Also, the corresponding research gap has been
identified. Subsequently, the objectives of developing the
taxonomy have been identified previously in this section,
thus constituting the second step of the design research
process.
The research model depicted in Figure 1 shows the core
steps performed in this paper. As a preparation for develop-
ing the taxonomy, the body of related literature is analyzed
in regards to possible elements of an OSN attribute taxon-
omy (Section IV). A conceptualization of fundamental user
activities between the user, the OSN and possibly the user’s
contacts that affect user data complements this analysis (step
1 in Figure 1). Based on these foundations, the proposed
taxonomy is discussed thoroughly, which corresponds to the
third step of the design research process model [27].
Evaluation is deemed as a central and essential activity
[28] and a key element [29] in design-oriented research.
Correspondingly, the design research process [27] contains
both a demonstration and a dedicated evaluation step. The
taxonomy is demonstrated (step 2 in Figure 1) by applying
it to four major OSNs and identifying actually implemented
data types for each element of the taxonomy (Section V).
On this basis, the taxonomy is evaluated (step 3 in Figure
1) in regards to the contribution to its three objectives that
were stated above.
The presentation of results in this paper concludes one
iteration of the design science process and corresponds to
the communication step.
IV. PROPOSED TAXONOMY
To arrive at a taxonomy for OSN data types, this section
follows the previously outlined research model. In an initial
step and based on Section II, a thorough literature analysis
reveals in essence the following three related approaches:
Schneier [19], its refinement by Arnes et al. [25] and the
classification by Beye et al. [24]. Table I correlates the data
elements of these approaches and the taxonomy proposed in
this work, while the subsequent discussion of this section
highlights conceptual similarities and deviations.
The analysis of Table I leads to several observations:
Firstly, it reveals that to some extent terminology is not
consistently used, such as the different understanding of
behavioral data [19], [25] and behavioral information [24].
Secondly, a general lack of granularity can be attributed
to some existing data type definitions, as observable in the
generic conceptualization of profiles in [24]. Consequently,
it is difficult to precisely specify data elements as needed in
scientific discussions. Lastly, some works either do not cover
all available data types, such as the missing specification of
data related to the connection with other users in [19] or
focus on data elements whose existence is difficult to verify
(e.g. the probability-based derived data in [19], [25] that
stems from the combination of several other data types).
Based on the analysis of existing literature, this work
follows a user-centric approach by studying data that is
created during possible user activities on OSNs. Figure 2
illustrates OSN entities and possible activities. As can be
seen, most activities are either initiated by the user or one
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Figure 2. Fundamental user activities on OSNs
of his contacts. The subsequent elicitation of data types will
refer to the numbered steps in Figure 2 to clarify the origin
of a particular data element.
As a taxonomy is commonly regarded a hierarchical
classification, this paper takes a top-down approach step-
wise subdividing the set of data types into non-redundant
partitions. The process is repeated until all data types are
classified. At the first level, a distinction is made based
on the stakeholder for whom a particular data type is of
use. From a privacy point of view, two stakeholders are
distinguishable [30]: Service providers and OSN users. The
former group offers OSN platforms and related services
whereas personal data commonly provides the basis of their
business model. For OSN users as the second stakeholder,
personal data is used for the purpose of SIdM. In the
following, accruing data types for each stakeholder are
discussed in detail.
A. Service Provider-related Data Types
Note that while service providers of centralized OSNs
typically have access to personal data that is generated in
user-related activities, this section discusses only data that
originates from service usage. Drawing on user activities
identified in Figure 2, several service provider-related activ-
ities can be identified. In the following, data emerging from
these activities is classified into three separate data types.
Login data. OSN service usage requires prior user au-
thentication to prevent identity theft, which is represented by
activity 8 in Figure 2 and is consistent with the respective
data type in [24] (cf. Table I). Consequently, login data is
considered a data type that is required by the OSN service
provider to provide evidence of a claimed identity. Common
instances of this data type are identifiers such as username
and email address as well as passwords used to verify an
identity. From a privacy perspective, identifiers such as the
user’s email address may facilitate the linkability of different
partial identities, which eventually leads to the compilation
of a more comprehensive profile.
Connection data. While not OSN specific, requesting
– i.e. connecting to and using – Internet-based services
(activity 8 in Figure 2) leads to a variety of digital traces
created by protocols on several layers of the OSI model.
Table I shows that the definition is consistent with [25],
while a broader conceptualization is used in [24]. Instances
include the user’s IP address, the type of communication
unit (such as mobile devices), information related to the
browser and the operating system, and location (derived
from the IP address or using GPS). Especially browser-
related information and location are deemed sensitive and
entail privacy implications when being available to OSN
service providers, such as for acquiring detailed user infor-
mation through cookies and browsing history or for creating
a movement profile based on location data.
Application data. Besides OSN platform usage, data
originating from the use of third party services (activity
6 in Figure 2) running within the boundaries of the OSN
platform or having API access can be differentiated. None
of the related works explicitly focuses on this type of data.
Common examples are player statistics of OSN games,
application usage statistics, or In-App purchase data such
as credit card information. Depending on the data instance,
privacy implications may range from none to serious.
B. User-related Data Types
To model the diversity of a user’s personality and his ways
of social interaction, an OSN account offers a variety of
means to express oneself and communicate with other users.
Fundamentally, two classes of data can be distinguished:
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Figure 3. Proposed taxonomy of OSN data types
Semantically specified and semantically unspecified data.
The first category refers to data instances that have a clearly
defined meaning and its content is clearly understood. Ex-
amples include predefined attribute types of an OSN profile
such as name, birthdate, and hometown. Yet, OSN service
providers have acknowledged that it is difficult to force all
aspects of a user’s personality into well-specified conceptual
boxes. Hence, semantically unspecified data types are pro-
vided to freely express some facets of one’s personality, such
as status posts whose content is not semantically predefined.
1) Semantically Specified:
Data elements available for self-description and expression
of one’s personality can be further subdivided into manda-
tory and optional data types.
Mandatory data. Similar to the physical world, a min-
imal set of data is required to initiate social interaction.
Consequently, this class covers data that is needed for an
OSN service to be useful and to enable basic functionalities
such as user discovery and verification purposes. Mandatory
data refers to personal information that needs to be provided
by the user during the registration or profile creation process
(activity 7 in Figure 2), which – except for the term –
corresponds with [19] and [25] (cf. Table I). A common
example is the user’s name serving as an identifier for
other users to create a social graph. Due to age verification
processes because of possibly inappropriate content and in
order to preclude immature users, the user’s birthday is
also a frequently required attribute. Privacy implications for
mandatory data depend on the concrete implementation by
a OSN service provider. It needs to be examined whether
mandatory data becomes part of the OSN user’s profile and
if privacy settings are available to restrict its visibility.
Optionally-provided Data:
Besides mandatory data, several data types with clearly
specified semantics exist on OSNs that are subsequently
discussed.
Extended profile data. OSNs offer a variety of predefined
attribute types that may be used to further describe particular
aspects of one’s personality. Note that extended profile data
solely refers to the user’s profile while other parts of an OSN
account are covered by further data types. Consequently,
properties of extended profile data are: profile-centricity,
optionality, predefined attribute types with clear semantics
and in some cases predefined attribute values. Typically,
the process of providing extended profile data (activity 7
in Figure 2) is guided by a form that contains input fields
for attribute types like address, education, favorite music,
favorite films, hobbies, interests, etc. The profile picture,
which is a common feature of OSNs, is also arranged in
this category. According to Table I, this conceptualization is
in line with [19] and [25], while the profiles category in [24]
is considered too coarse-grained. From the optionality of this
data type it follows that privacy risks are manageable as it is
down to the user to decide whether to disclose a particular
personal attribute. On closer examination, available privacy
settings are to be considered as these define the granularity
of the potential audience that may access an attribute.
Ratings/interests. Besides extended profile data that al-
lows for a rich description, the study of user activities (ac-
tivities 5 and 9 in Figure 2) reveals that binary or predefined
multi-value attributes related to existing entities such as
pages and shared items are used to refine how one is seen
by others (e.g. by liking favorite bands). Corresponding with
[24] in Table I, this class of data covers expressed interests
such as Facebook’s Like and Google’s +1 and the rating of
photos shared by other users, whereas privacy implications
depend on default or available visibility settings.
Network data. As social interaction is an inherent prop-
erty of OSNs, users are encouraged to express their relation-
ship with other users (activity 5 in Figure 2). The collection
of all connections of a particular user is often referred to
as his social graph [24] and describes data concerning the
network the user has built around himself on the OSN, which
conforms to the definition of [25] as presented in Table I.
From the viewpoint of a particular user, a single instance
of network data has a binary value, i.e. a connection either
exists or not. Network data may be uni- or bidirectional and
differ in the strength of a connection. Common examples
include the notions of friend, friend-of-friend, follower, and
someone you are following. Depending on its concrete
implementation, network data may be visible by default or
access to it can be controlled by the user. As knowledge
of a user’s social graph allows to draw inferences about his
identity, access to network data significantly impacts privacy.
Contextual data. While some data shared on OSNs
contains an atomic piece of information (such as the user’s
birthdate), other items such as pictures enclose a multitude
of information. This class of data refers to a property of
an existing item that is made explicit and provided with se-
mantics, hence forming a new data type. Common examples
include the tagging feature, allowing to make peoples’ names
(and eventually their identity) in an existing picture explicitly
available to other OSN users (activity 3 in Figure 2). Further
instances are the location of a picture and the relation of a
shared item to an activity or an event. The comparison of
existing taxonomies in Table I shows that while correspond-
ing with [24], this type of data is only partly covered in [19]
and [25]. Contextual information poses a serious privacy risk
as information that was previously not machine-processable
(e.g. searchable) is made explicitly known to the system and
consequently impacts a user’s representation on the social
network. Yet, an OSN’s implementation of this data type
needs to be thoroughly examined to estimate its concrete
privacy implications.
2) Semantically Unspecified:
Semantically unspecified data refers to data elements pro-
vided by the OSN where the data format is predefined but
whose content is left to the user and cannot trivially be
interpreted by machines. For instance, a photo album feature
predefines the format (digital photos) but leaves the picture’s
content to the user. As a consequence, on the one hand it is
difficult to make generalizations on privacy risks associated
with semantically unspecified data types where risks largely
depend on the content. On the other hand, the lack of
semantic specification impedes OSN service providers from
automatically processing this data.
To further refine the classification, a distinction can be
made between data used in 1:1 and 1:n communication.
Private communication data. This class covers data
elements that originate from private communication (i.e.
1:1 communication) between two OSN users (activity 4 in
Figure 2), which is only partly covered in [24] as illustrated
in Table I. While private communication may comprise text
messages as well as other media formats, their content is not
semantically specified. Examples include private messages
Table II
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DISCLOSED DATA, ENTRUSTED DATA,
INCIDENTAL DATA AND SHARED DATA
Creator Publisher Domain
Disclosed data User User User
Entrusted data User User Contact
Incidental data Contact Contact User
Disseminated data User Contact Contact
with or without attachments, private video chats as well
as smaller interactions such as poking other users. Private
communication data is not accompanied with privacy risks
as long as the communication partner can be trusted, the
OSN security mechanisms prevent third parties from gaining
access and the OSN service provider does not inspect the
messages to an extent greater than roughly scanning them
for illegal content.
1:n Communication:
Besides private communication between two users, data
with semantically unspecified content can be shared with
an audience of n other users where n defines the degree of
publicness. Each of the subsequently discussed data types
is concerned with semantically unstructured data such as
photos, status messages, and comments, yet a differentiation
is made between creator, publisher, and the domain in which
the element is published (see Table II). As can be seen from
Table I, the first three data types subsequently discussed are
based on [19] and [25].
Disclosed data. A frequent user activity on OSNs is to
post information on one’s wall (activities 2 and 11 in Figure
2). In conceptual terms, the data is generated and published
by a user in his own domain. From a privacy perspective,
the user has full control over the visibility within the limits
of the concrete implementation as no other user is affected
with the shared item.
Entrusted data. In contrast, entrusted data refers to
information that is both user-generated and user-published
but in the domain of a contact (activities 2 and 10 in Figure
2), i.e. the former is able to shape the latter’s representation
on the OSN. Consequently, once the data is shared, control
passes over to the domain owner that is from then on able to
define its visibility. Whether this ability is only extended or
shifts completely depends on the concrete OSN. Examples
include posts and comments made on another user’s wall or
a similar space. Privacy implications mainly arise from the
loss of control once the data element is published.
Incidental data. Incidental data originates from a contact
sharing a data element on the user’s wall (activities 1 and 11
in Figure 2), i.e. the contact is both creator and publisher,
however the information is shared in the user’s domain. In
this scenario, a contact is able to shape the presentation of
the user on the OSN. As a consequence, the user gains
control over the item, whereas the extent depends on the
concrete implementation.
Disseminated data. In the last case of Table II, user-
generated data elements are considered that are further
disseminated by a contact within his own domain (activities
1 and 10 in Figure 2). This may include data elements that
the user has initially shared with the contact or provided to
him using other communication channels. In the first case,
which is also discussed in [18], the OSN may prevent the
contact from publishing the item with a larger than the user’s
intended audience and grant additional permissions to the
user. However in the second case, the contact remains the
only person to control the visibility of the data element,
raising serious privacy implications.
C. Summary
Figure 3 provides an overview of the proposed taxonomy
based on the previous discussion. It comprises 13 data types
that are integrated in a hierarchical structure. The analysis
of privacy implications of data types revealed that privacy
mainly depends on the interplay of a data element’s content,
the extent and granularity of user control, and its concrete
implementation. The content may be easily accessible to
service providers for data types with clear semantics, while
semantically unspecified data requires human cognition
for interpretation. Besides, each service provider decides
whether the collection and visibility of a particular data
type is user-controllable. If user control exists, its granularity
largely depends on the concrete OSN implementation.
In the subsequent section, the application of the taxonomy
to four major OSNs is demonstrated and their usefulness to
address the objectives stated in Section I is evaluated.
V. EVALUATION
A. Evaluation Approach
One approach to provide a suitable evaluation is to focus
on demonstration, which is described as a light-weight
evaluation in [28]. In [27], the task of demonstration is
defined as showing the use of the artifact to solve one or
more instances of the problem. Transferred to the given
context, applying the taxonomy to different OSNs seems
appropriate.
In the following, four major OSNs – Facebook, Google+,
Twitter, LinkedIn – are analyzed under the aspect of using
the proposed taxonomy. Note that the intention of the analy-
sis is to show the feasibility of the taxonomy in general and
to present the most common and most important examples
for each data type. With the help of these examples, the
main differences between the inspected OSNs can be shown
in a descriptive way that is comprehensible for casual OSN
users as well.
B. Application of the Taxonomy to OSNs
Table III gives an overview on data types on OSNs as
available on February 15, 2013.
1) Service Provider-related Data Types:
Login data can be found on all OSNs. The four inspected
ones all provide a login via email and password. On Face-
book, the phone number can replace the email. On Twitter,
a login is alternatively possible via username and password.
Connection data is collected by all OSNs. In order to in-
spect the items arranged in this category, the privacy policies
of the four OSNs have been analyzed. It is important to state
that these policies do not list every single data item collected
through the use of the platform. For example, Google tries
to arrange the collected data into three categories (device
information, log information, location information) and then
mentions the most important examples. However, splitting
up connection data in the three data types mentioned above
does not lead to better results regarding the taxonomy
because the analyzed providers do not define them in the
same way or do not define any broad categories at all.
Moreover, the four inspected OSNs differ in the examples
they list and their level of detail.
Application data is available on all four inspected OSNs
because for all of them there are connectors for external
websites or unofficial smartphone apps. On Facebook and
Google+, the number of third party applications is bigger by
far as there are a lot of providers for games. As mentioned
in Section IV, games may process credit card information
because of In-App purchases whereas website connectors
and smartphone apps do not collect additional data except
for the usage statistics. An important characteristic of ap-
plication data is its optionality, i.e. the user decides about
the use of third party applications. In the majority of cases,
confirmation for requested permissions is required before
being able to use an application. Consequently, user control
is implemented on a binary decision basis.
2) User-related Data:
As all OSNs include profiles, mandatory data and extended
profile data always exist. Basic items of mandatory data
are name, email, birthday and gender. The first two items
are mandatory on all inspected OSNs, the latter two items
are only required on Facebook and Google+. In contrast,
LinkedIn forces the user to indicate his job status, which
is motivated by the way LinkedIn describes itself – as a
network for professionals. Note that email, birthday and
gender can usually be hidden from other users (indicated
by * in Table III), giving the user the ability to alleviate
certain threats (e.g. social engineering attacks with the help
of personalized emails).
Which extended profile data is ultimately present in
addition to the profile photo and the cover photo – each
inspected OSN uses these concepts – depends on whether
the OSN is a platform for general purposes (e.g. Facebook,
Google+) or for rather specialized ones (e.g. LinkedIn).
Facebook and Google+ offer the user the ability to provide
a variety of attributes such as basic info, contact info, work,
education and living. Similarly, LinkedIn offers additional
Table III
DEMONSTRATION OF THE TAXONOMY ON FACEBOOK, GOOGLE+, TWITTER AND LINKEDIN
Data types Facebook Google+ Twitter LinkedIn
Login data Email, phone, password Email, password Email, username, password Email, password
Connection data Device information, log
information, location
information, cookies
Device information, log
information, location
information, cookies
Device information, log
information, location
information, cookies
Device information, log
information, location
information, cookies
Application data Usage statistics, credit card
information
Usage statistics, credit card
information
Usage statistics Usage statistics
Mandatory data Name, email*, birthday*,
gender*
Name, email*, birthday*,
gender*
Name, email* Name, email, job status
Extended profile
data
Several general-purpose
input fields
Several general-purpose
input fields
Three single input fields
(location, website, bio)
Several professionally-
related input fields
Ratings/interests Page, status/photo/video Page, status/photo/video Verified account, Tweet Company, status
Network data Unidirectional, bidirectional Unidirectional Unidirectional Bidirectional
Contextual data Tag in status/comment, on
photo, at location
Tag in status/comment, on
photo, at location
Mention in Tweet n/a
Private communi-
cation data
Private message, video chat,
poke
Private message, video chat Private message Private message
Disclosed data Text post, photo (album),
video, check-in
Text post, photo (album),
video, check-in
Text post, single photo Text post
Entrusted data See disclosed data Restricted to comments on
disclosed data
n/a Restricted to comments on
disclosed data
Incidental data See disclosed data Restricted to comments on
disclosed data
n/a Restricted to comments on
disclosed data
Disseminated data See disclosed data See disclosed data See disclosed data See disclosed data
data elements to refine one’s profile but with a professional
focus (such as experience and skills). In contrast to the
three OSNs mentioned before, Twitter does not focus on
this detailed self-presentation in one’s profile and only
offers three single input fields for extended profile data.
Although the provision of extended profile data is optional
on all OSNs, only Facebook and Google+ offer a selective
disclosure of attribute values. On Twitter and LinkedIn, they
are either publicly visible or only available to oneself.
Ratings/interests is a category that possesses differing
importance on OSNs but can be observed on all of them.
On Facebook and Google+, it is possible to express one’s
preference for all kinds of pages (e.g. persons, products,
sports). On Twitter and LinkedIn, the pages mainly resemble
verified accounts of well-known persons and companies,
respectively. Moreover, the focus lies more on staying in-
formed about these pages rather than publicly demonstrating
certain interests. Besides the pages mentioned above, the
inspected OSNs all provide mechanisms to express one’s
favor for the items that are available as disclosed data.
When focusing on the user’s control over the visibility of his
preferences, pages and disclosed data have to be discussed
separately. For disclosed data, the visibility of one’s favor
always depends on the visibility of the corresponding item,
whereas for pages, at least the users of Facebook and
Google+ have the option to hide their preferences.
As the term Online Social Network already indicates,
OSNs always include network data. The main difference
between OSNs is whether the connections are bidirectional
(e.g. Facebook, LinkedIn) or unidirectional (e.g. Google+,
Twitter). As shown in Table III, Facebook is the only OSN
that supports both types of connections at the same time.
However, the unidirectional connections have to be enabled
by the user before others are able to follow him without
befriending him. Another important difference can be ob-
served when analyzing the user’s ability to hide his social
graph from other users. Facebook, Google+ and LinkedIn
implement this feature, whereas Twitter always reveals your
followers and the users you are following.
Further differences between the inspected OSNs can be
observed when analyzing the presence of contextual data.
On Facebook and Google+, the user has the ability to tag his
contacts in text posts/comments, on photos and at locations.
Although being limited to text posts, Twitter’s tagging
feature creates more extensive privacy issues than the ones
provided by Facebook and Google+ because Twitter’s users
lack the ability to remove these tags on their own. LinkedIn
does not support this feature at all, which can be traced
back to the previously mentioned motivation of establishing
a network of professionals who have little use for this.
Private communication data can also be found on all
OSNs because sending private messages is always possible.
Facebook and Google+ offer this feature via instant mes-
saging and without any limitations concerning availability
and text length. On Twitter, private messages are provided
via Direct Messages, which resemble a private Tweet and
therefore are limited to 140 characters. LinkedIn calls their
private messages InMail and does not offer them to users
with basic accounts. In addition to text messages, Facebook
and Google+ offer video chats as another type of private
communication data. Facebook also has the poking feature
mentioned in Section IV.
Significant discrepancies concerning the availability of
the data types have been identified when posting items.
Firstly, there are differences in the complexity of the items
and secondly, the ability to post them can be restricted
to the user’s own domain. Facebook and Google+ enable
their users to post text, photos, photo albums, videos, their
current location and other objects (e.g. questions, events). In
contrast, Twitter limits its Tweets to text and single photos.
Note that users have the possibility to enrich their text posts
with their current location or a link to an uploaded video
but not to disclose these elements outside of a Tweet. On
LinkedIn, it is only possible to post text which, however,
can also be enriched with a link to other objects. Regardless
of the complexity of the items, the user is always able to post
them in his own domain (disclosed data) as well as to share
the ones originally published by his contacts (disseminated
data). On the contrary, posting in foreign domains without
any content-wise limitations is only possible on Facebook
(entrusted data and vice versa incidental data). However,
Facebook’s users can turn off this feature in their privacy
settings and are able to control the visibility of incidental
data on a fine-grained level. On Google+ and LinkedIn,
posting in foreign domains is limited to commenting on
items disclosed by the domain’s owner. These comments
inherit the visibility of their corresponding items, giving the
domain’s owner full control over them. Publicly addressing
contacts on Twitter is done by making a response (e.g.
@johndoe), which does not appear in the contact’s domain
and therefore is not treated as entrusted data. As incidental
data is just the opposite of entrusted data, it is limited on
Google+ and LinkedIn, and cannot be found on Twitter.
C. Evaluation Summary
Summarizing the application of the taxonomy, most of its
elements can be found on all of the four inspected OSNs
demonstrating the suitability to describe the most important
characteristics of OSNs. Furthermore, the evaluation demon-
strated the taxonomy’s capability of capturing different in-
stantiations of a particular data type on different OSNs and
the number of items contained in it. This is especially true
for extended profile data where Twitter provides only three
additional input fields because of the nonexistent desire for
self-presentation and where LinkedIn focuses more on work
and science affiliated attributes because of the orientation to-
wards professional networks. Another important observation
is that Facebook has most features, especially concerning
the distinctive data types, i.e. entrusted/incidental data and
contextual data. Hence, there are more potential hazards for
casual OSN users and more aspects that might be interesting
for researchers in this area.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the growing body of research addressing OSN
privacy issues, currently data as one of the fundamental
building blocks of OSN is not well understood. The lack
of a generally accepted terminology and classification for
existing data elements as well as the small number of
publications considering implications of differing semantics
of data types for social identity management on these sites
further substantiate the argument.
Yet, data is at the core of any discussion of privacy issues
on OSN. Without a precise terminology and classification
of all types of data on OSN it is difficult to unambiguously
specify privacy-related problems which ultimately impedes
the development of appropriate solutions.
To address these shortcomings, a taxonomy for OSN data
types was developed in this paper. Based on a design-
oriented methodology, first the body of literature was an-
alyzed to identify possible data elements and terminologi-
cal inconsistencies. Subsequently, a hierarchically-structured
taxonomy was derived by studying fundamental user activi-
ties on OSNs and step-wise classifying identified data types
into non-redundant partitions. The discussion of data types
revealed that privacy mainly depends on the interplay of a
data element’s content, the extent and granularity of user
control, and its concrete implementation. The subsequent
evaluation of applying the taxonomy to four major OSNs
demonstrates its applicability to existing OSNs and reveals
implementation-specific differences in privacy settings of
various data types.
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